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Abstract: Using zero-inflated Poison and negative binominal models to account for zero observations and binominal regression in the data, this study examines how 
irrigation patterns in Croatia vary across municipalities, with differing agricultural structures, income levels, human capital, fiscal revenues, unemployment rates, 
development intensities and voting profiles. The target population was irrigation adopted by farmers across Croatia and included 548 municipalities. Irrigation as a type of 
public good is a form of targeted economic development policy that benefits production. This research examines the following hypothesis: Do municipalities in Croatia 
adopt irrigation to benefit economically depressed regions and what types of agricultural structures predict the adoption of irrigation?  
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1  INTRODUCTION  
 
The location and intensity of economic activities 
highly depend on the availability of water for agricultural 
and industrial production, sanitation and waste 
assimilation, transportation, and aesthetic and recreational 
benefits [1]. The empirical evidence suggests that 
economies of scale in farm production are insignificant, 
except in some plantation crops, as result of irrigation, 
and that they are more insignificant in terms of processing 
and marketing than in terms of production [2]. An 
irrigation water management system exists at different 
scales for both irrigation (from irrigation field to irrigation 
consortia) and administration (from municipality to 
region) [3]. In this paper, we will focus on the irrigation 
equipment scattered across Croatia's municipalities. This 
research will try to examine the following main 
hypothesis: Do the municipalities in Croatia adopt 
irrigation to benefit economically depressed regions, and 
what type of agricultural structure predicts this adoption? 
As is already known, the rapid uptake of small private 
irrigation in South Asia has demonstrated a positive effect 
on poverty alleviation [4].  
The following research questions are asked in this 
paper in an effort to analyze the main problem: what 
characteristics explain and predict the probability that a 
municipality in Croatia utilizes an irrigation system 
program, and what characteristics explain the frequency 
with which municipalities choose to cover a particular 
sized area with irrigation? 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section 
begins by mapping out the research strategy, including the 
conceptual framework, the dataset, the model 
specification and the variables. The subsequent section 
presents and discusses the empirical results, and the final 
section concludes by providing implications for economic 
policy and further research. 
 
2  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Agrarian Economic Theory and Its Determinants 
 
 Irrigation systems designate specific agrarian areas 
as "land zones" that qualify for irrigation equipment 
adoption and watering. Basic agrarian economic theory 
suggests that the intensified watering of land will increase 
the odds of transforming unfertile into more fertile land 
and hence increase the ability to develop select agrarian 
activities at the local level. In addition to allowing 
products with greater profit margins, the outcomes of 
investment in irrigation facilities can involve, for 
example, a guaranteed level of supply, price stability, and 
product quality; however, here we focus only on product 
selection response to the irrigation area. These products 
may involve opportunistic gains from vineyards and 
orchards, as well as from ordinary types of plantations 
saying vegetable gardens and nursery varieties of edible 
and ornamental plants instead of other less profitable 
crops. Some authors [5] have showed that irrigation water 
supplied through a collective irrigation network in the 
Marjeyoun region (South Lebanon) increases the area 
occupied by high value crops. The small family farm is 
often the most efficient unit of production [6]. The force 
of agrarian intensity acts in opposition to the force of 
alternative economic structures (industry, services) in a 
municipality. To measure the effect of agrarian intensity 
on the area under irrigation, we included agricultural 
households in the analysis. Agricultural households and 
land in use are adopted in this research as proxy variables 
for the dominant agricultural strategy of the local 
community.  
However, this theory is built upon a number of key 
assumptions that are only connected to the agrarian side 
of the interlinked story; more complex theory that 
involves pure socio-economic variables at the 
municipality level might produce different conclusions. 
For example, economic considerations suggest that the 
propensity to adopt irrigation in a field depends on the 
excepted net gain in yield (revenue) from such an 
adoption [7]. The net gain in yield is connected to land 
quality and well depth, which are important factors in the 
choice of irrigation technology [8]. Our theoretical model, 
which we attempt to verify in this paper, is based on the 
above-mentioned orthodox agrarian economic theory 
augmented by specific socio-economic, political and 
regional factors. 
 
2.2  Socio-Economic Determinants  
 
Municipal policy choices are the product of societal 
actors’ responses to changing economic and social 
conditions. Rational economic theory predicts that local 
state decision makers are more likely to adopt some type 
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of irrigation system as a form of public good under 
conditions of economic duress. Assuming that the 
maintenance and management of an irrigation system 
provide a public good to rural communities, if the 
economic conditions in the municipality worsen, officials 
are more likely to respond by enacting IS (IS) as part of 
the infrastructure. There are increasing returns in the 
provision of irrigation [9]. We operationalize economic 
distress using the annual unemployment rate (the CDLL 
database, 2014). Agricultural wage and aggregate 
employment in the economy may also improve due to 
irrigation policy [10]. At too low a wage, the productivity 
of a worker may also be too low for the employer to be 
interested in hiring him. We also include an annual 
measure of municipality per capita income and a 
development index to assess whether there are any policy 
differences between more and less wealthy municipalities 
in terms of targeted agrarian development policies with an 
emphasis on irrigation. In wealthier municipalities, we 
assume that there will be less political pressure to design 
IS to address the need to water relatively unfertile soil. 
Admittedly, evidence exists in the literature that income is 
strongly correlated with landscaping irrigation volumes in 
the city of Los Angeles as well as with landscape 
greenness. As such, higher incomes, higher outdoor water 
use and greener landscapes are closely related [11]. 
However, in those countries in which agriculture 
represents an important economic activity, the greater the 
pressure that human activity places on water resources, 
the more that agriculture monopolizes available water 
resources, often through irrigation practices [12]. The 
larger the government revenue per capita and the higher 
on the development index, the less likely it is that a 
municipality will adopt an IS and increase the number of 
ha (hectares) under a watering regime. Governments 
should reduce their spending in unproductive sectors such 
as defence and curtail excessive subsidies in fertilizer, 
irrigation, power, and pesticides [13]. We include human 
capital in our further specification because if local 
decision makers are going to develop an underdeveloped 
region, they need a well-educated, skilled workforce to 
attract investment and human capital (from outside of the 
region). Therefore, to assess whether human capital stock 
positively affects the presence of an IS in a municipality, 
we examined the link between the adoption of IS and 
human capital. There is clear-cut evidence of a strong 
positive relationship between the schooling of a child and 
that child’s future earnings as an adult. Schultz (1988) 
provides a good review of the statistical problems 
associated with estimating the effect of education on 
productivity [14]. A better education is a long-term 
element that contributes to an increase in income [15], 
and with that increase, living conditions including water 
supply become a priority. 
 
2.3  Partisanship/Ideology Determinants 
 
         Partisan or ideological models would suggest that 
changes in the composition of a micro-state’s political 
elite should lead to a change in agrarian development 
policy at the municipality level. Irrigation works require 
substantial investment [16]. Irrigation systems as part of 
the infrastructure in rural environments are a function of 
redistributive economic development policies that 
distribute public resources (e.g., water) from the haves to 
the have-nots as a rare input (for, e.g., agriculture). In 
fact, irrigation can be adapted to increase the efficiency of 
water use in agriculture. In that case, the limiting factors 
to such development are political commitment, policies, 
investments, and agronomic and management skills rather 
than the amount of water resources [12]. Political 
commitment is included within our model. Because 
political elites have differing views on redistributive 
social programs, we predict that political elites are likely 
to have differing views on irrigation projects based on 
their partisan and ideological orientations. To assess 
whether agrarian policy towards the construction of IS is 
affected by partisan or ideological factors, we include a 
measure of local executive partisan control and ideology 
based on the voting results for the Sabor (Croat 
parliament). We use the number of valid votes for central 
parliament per municipality. A "1" as a dummy variable 
indicates unified right-conservative control of the state 
government, whereas a "0" indicates unified left-liberal 
control of the state government. Because the supporters of 
IS projects over the past decade were a conservative 
coalition, we predict that municipalities controlled by the 
SDP coalition are less likely to adopt IS projects because 
their programs target assistance to traditionally left-wing 
democratic constituencies in urban areas. 
 
2.4  Regional Determinants  
 
Finally, we include a dummy variable for the three 
major regions to control for tradition and historical 
patterns in policy outcomes. However, we lack a prior 
theory of mutual interactions that would correlate with the 
dummy response variable.  
 
2.5  Data Set and Sources  
 
In this paper, secondary sources are used. The 
secondary data in this study are taken from various 
sources and refer to different variables. They cover 548 
(out of 555) municipalities; seven municipalities were 
discarded from the sample due to incomplete data. The 
sampling frame of the newly created dataset is based on a 
list of almost all of the municipalities of Croatia. First, the 
data on the irrigation areas (IAs) are deduced from the 
Global Map of Irrigation Areas CROATIA and those data 
are retrieved from FAO 2013 [17]. Second, the variety of 
arable land use as well as data for agrarian households in 
Croatia are obtained from the Review of Agriculture 2003 
(source: Croatian Department of Statistics). Third, we 
have the Croatian values for development and a 
calculation of the development index at the local level 
(henceforth, the CDLL). The CDLL is a cross-sectional, 
economic, nationally representative list of municipalities 
designed and calculated with the technical assistance of 
the Ministry of Regional Development and EU funds to 
measure microeconomic development in Croatia (2014, 
October 13). This dataset is retrieved from The Ministry 
of Regional Development and EU Funds of the Republic 
of Croatia [18]. Finally, the ELECTORAL database [19] 
covers the electoral results of Croatia's national 
parliamentary elections at the sub-national level. 
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3  MODEL SPECIFICATIONS  
 
The standard method for statistically confirming facts 
is to test hypotheses. In our case, we formulate the null 
hypothesis H0 that IA presence is not related to the 
various agricultural, socio-economic, political and 
regional determinants. The related, alternative hypothesis 
is denoted H1.  
We use the two models to test sets of hypotheses that 
explain the creation and subsequent proliferation of 
irrigation areas. 
The first model, using the presence of irrigation (IA) 
as a dependent variable, will be estimated by logit 
regression: 
 
),1 ,0(   , NconstY ≈++= ∑∗ εεβX                             (1) 
 
if Y* > 0, y =1; Y* = 0, y = 0; 
 
where Y* = IA presence (yes or no), X = vector of 
independent variable. 
The estimation of a model for IA size will be 
performed by a double-hurdle regression.  
As the regression’s name suggests, two hurdles must 
be crossed to designate a size (land plots of IA in hectares, 
in this case). The "first hurdle" must be crossed to 
distribute the IA by size. Because municipalities are 
potentially the planners of the new irrigation area, their 
current circumstances dictate whether they enlarge the IA 
size and how much; this is the second hurdle. 
 This model is able to capture a high number of zeros 
[20], e.g., municipalities without irrigation design. The 
hurdle model assumes that all zero data referring to IA are 
from a single "structural" source. The positive (i.e., 
nonzero) data have a "sampling" origin, following a 
truncated Poisson, truncated Geometrical or truncated 
negative binomial II (Negbin II) distribution (see the sub-
chapters referring to distribution selections). For example, 
consider a study of IS users in which a secondary 
outcome is the number of tons of vegetables produced 
during the previous year. In this case, it is safe to assume 
that only non-producers will output zero tons and that all 
vegetable producers will score some positive (nonzero) 
number of tons during the last year. Hence, the zero 
observations can come from only one "structural" source: 
non-producers. If a subject is considered to be a 
municipality with vegetable producers, they do not have 
the "ability" to score zero tons of vegetables produced 
during the last year and will always score a positive 
number of tons in a hurdle model with either truncated 
Poisson, truncated geometrical or truncated Negbin II 
distributions. 
The double hurdle model contains two equations that 
are written as follows: 
 
iii u'Zd +=
∗ α ,                                                               (2) 
ii v'Xy +=
∗ β .                                                               (3) 
  
The two error terms are assumed to be independently 
distributed.  
 The hurdle model consists of two parts (hence, it is 
also called a ‘two-part model’). The first part is binary 
(given by a count distribution right-censored at y = 1): is 
yi (the size of IA) equal to zero or is it positive? The 
second part is counted (given by a count distribution of 
the size variable left-truncated at y = 1): if yi > 0, how 
large is yi? 
Finally, the observed variable, yi, is determined by the 
interaction of both hurdles as follows: 
 
∗∗= ii ydy .                                                                       (4)                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Decisions regarding whether to invest in IS and the 
size enlargement of area Y can be jointly modelled. The 
questions to be answered include whether these are 
determined simultaneously by the decision-maker; 
whether these are determined separately and 
independently; or whether one decision is made first and 
affects the other sequentially (this is the dominance 
model, which will be used in this paper). Therefore, 
below we regress size on all further variables for the 
count part of the model and model the inflation part as a 
function of the same variables.  
 
4  EMPIRICAL METHOD AND RESULTS  
 
The research questions discussed earlier considered 
the utilization of IS programs to be a two-stage process 
with sequential decisions (Tab. 2 and Tab. 3). In the first 
stage, a decision is made by a municipality concerning 
whether or not to construct an irrigation facility to benefit 
an economically depressed community. In the second 
stage, another decision is made by the municipality to 
determine the size of the irrigation area. For both stages, 
the decision is affected by the factors described in the 
conceptual framework. However, the effects of these 
factors on decisions can be different at different stages. 
Hence, we applied a two-stage model to investigate the 
determinants of utilization of irrigation equipment. 
In the first stage, we predicted the probability of a 
municipality utilizing an IA. Our dependent variable is 
binary; therefore, the probability was modelled using a 
binary regression. In the second stage, we predicted the 
frequency of IS by taking into consideration the size of 
these areas. Our dependent variable here is a count 
variable that reflects the number of ha used in irrigation 
adoption. In this stage, as a dependent variable rounded to 
an integer, we added the frequency of IS measured by the 
discrete size of the plot and expressed in ha.  
 
4.1  Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Because this study used a two-stage model, we 
employed two distinct dependent variables. For the first 
stage, the dependent variable was whether a local 
government has adopted some type of irrigation 
infrastructure to stimulate agro-economic activity. This 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the IA concept is adopted. Conversely, it takes the value 
of 0 if an IA does not transpire or is absent in the rural 
community. 
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     As a secondary dependent variable, we added the 
number of ISs in municipalities measured by size. For the 
second stage, the dependent variable was a size variable 
indicating the size of the land plots used in an irrigation 
enterprise for a municipality. This variable is continuous 
and varies from 0 to 283 ha in the first period and from 0 
to 356 in the second (see the range in Tab. 1). The IS has 
a right-skewed data distribution, as the mean of the data 
values is larger than the median. The distribution of the IS 
shows that three-quarters of the municipalities had 
irrigation facilities, while a minority did not. The 
distribution of this variable demonstrates that the highest 
proportion of municipalities (approximately 37-40%) had 
from 1 to 20 hectares covered by some form of irrigation 
during the period of observation. The second highest 
proportion (25.5-26.7%) represents municipalities with 
very small plots (equal to or less than one ha) under the 
irrigation regime, while a less considerable share, 
approximately 5-8%, had between 20 and 40 hectares 
irrigated. On the right side of the distribution, 
representing extensive irrigated areas, we have very few 
and sporadically distributed municipalities.   
The definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
are shown in Tab. 1.  
 
Table 1 Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables used in the empirical model estimation 
Variables Definitions Min Max Mean Median SD 
Dependent variables       
Dependent variable at 1st stage       
Binary variables of (presence) IA 
("1"/"0") 
"1" if an irrigation is adopted, 
"0" otherwise 0 1    
Dependent variable at 2nd stage   0 1    
Count variable  (area in ha) 
of IS, 2006-2008 Average area irrigated per plot (in hectares)  
0 283 8.8 1 26.05 
Count variable  (area in ha) 
of IS, 2010-2012 0 355.9 16.7 1.55 42.3 
Independent variables       
Agriculture 
Households 
Number of persons heading agricultural 
households 24 4786 790.2 598.5 698.8 
Orchards  Utilized agricultural area, in ha 0.09 1199.4 62.9 28.3 89.1 
Vineyard  Utilized agricultural area, in ha 0 291.9 18.3 2.5 37.2 
Vegetable Garden  Utilized agricultural area, in ha 0.02 73 9.6 6.4 9.7 
Nursery Plants  Utilized agricultural area, in ha 0 14.8 0.4 0.05 1.3 
Income Average per capita income of municipality,  in 2006-2008 7267 39687 19657 19080.5 5974 
Revenue    Average per capita revenue of municipality,  in 2006-2008 156 4237 2134 1295.5 2653 
Unemployment    Average unemployment rate of municipality, in 2006-2008 1.4 69.6 16.66 15.2 9.513 
Human Capital Stock of human capital of municipality,  in 2006-2008 15.30 85 54.70 54.65 13.06 
Development Index 
Development index of municipality,  
in 2006-2008  
 
16.13 282.8 80.55 77.02 24.776 
Income Average per capita income of municipality,  in 2010-2012 7105 42175 21623 21045 6084 
Revenue    Average per capita revenue of municipality,  in 2010-2012 223 10115 1984 1338 1696 
Unemployment    Average unemployment rate of municipality, in 2010-2012 4.5 54.8 18.88 17.3 9.16 
Human Capital Stock of human capital of municipality,  in 2010-2012 31.65 90.41 68.6 69.26 11.07 
Development Index Development index of municipality,  in 2010-2012 19.62 153.55 80.32 76.89 24.25 
Categorical variables (a)   Frequencies    
NW (b) Northwest Croatia (factor=1)  142 (25.6%)    
CEP Central and Eastern (Pannonian) Croatia (factor=2)  
197 
(35.5%)    
AC Adriatic Croatia (factor=3)  216 (38.9%)    
Dummy variable       
LGC 
Local government coalition dummy, taking the 
value of one if the authority is supported by a 
right-wing coalition (by more than half valid 
votes) and zero otherwise (c) 
0 1 0.59   
Notes: a) The frequencies with which the categories occur; b) Used as a base in the empirical model specification; c) The right-wing government in 2007 
was a coalition of the following political parties: HDZ, HSS, ZS, ZDS, PGS, HSP, and HDSSB; the left-wing coalition comprised SDP, HNS, HSU-SU, 
and IDS party members. 
 
The number of municipalities with a higher average 
IA size was greater in 2010-2012 than in 2006-2008, 
apparently because a higher percentage of investors 
participated in irrigation in the more recent period.  
The typical municipality in Croatia included on 
average 790 agricultural households measured by the 
number of household heads. Tab. 1 also provides 
information on specific agricultural activities in need of 
Zdravko ŠERGO et al.: The Modelling of Irrigation Allocation in Croatia 
176                                                                                                                                                                                                          Technical Gazette 25, 1(2018), 172-180 
irrigation facilities, namely, vegetable production from 
agricultural land utilization. Within arable land plots 
scattered across each municipality, an average of 63 
hectares of orchards nurtured by farmers occupy the 
majority share of agricultural land per municipality; next 
on the list is vineyards, followed by vegetable gardens. 
Nurseries represent the smallest share of plantations on 
average (only approximately 0.05 ha). 
The local communities in this paper appeared to be 
fairly typical in terms of the mix of rural and urban and 
similar to many suburban communities in Croatia with 
certain exceptions (see Tab. 1). Their average per capita 
income in 2006-2008 was approximately 19700 $, with 
some of the local communities being poorer than this and 
one reaching approximately 39700 $. When compared to 
per capita income figures for the later period of 
observation, one can see that the mean income per capita 
is slightly lower and there is minor divergence between 
the poorest and wealthiest communities. 
 Mean per capita fiscal revenue in 2010-2012 was 
somewhat lower than that in 2006-2008, showing that 
these trends occur due to the narrowing of the tax basis 
and may be a negative consequence of the great recession 
that began in 2009.  
The average annual unemployment rate in 2006-2008 
for these municipalities, at 16.66%, was higher than the 
national average of 15%, although the range of 
unemployment rates was rather large (1.4 to 69.6%). In 
2010-2012, despite the growth in the average 
unemployment rate, we noted convergence between the 
worst and the best municipalities. 
Human capital was measured using the share of the 
population with a high school education.  
A higher share of the population with an education 
indicates a higher quality labour force in the local 
community.  
    
Table 2 First stage: logit estimation of the probability of having an IA 
Variable 
Probability of 
having 0 IA 
2006-2008 
Probability of 
having 0 IA Probability of 
having 0 IA 
2010-2012 
Probability of 












coefficient Marginal effect 
Constant −8.026 (−1.478) 
−2.741*** 








(1.272)    
0.182 
(0.591)    
Orchards 0.262*      (2.103) 
0.381*** 




(3.090) 1.411 0.118 
Vineyard 0.142 ***    (5.835) 
0.145*** 









0.595 **     
(2.795) 
0.793*** 








(0.566)    
0.037 
(1.143)    
Human Capital 0.550      (0.666)    
−0.567 
(−0.481)    
Income −1.056 (−1.539)    
−0.952 
(−1.284)    
Revenue 0.005 (0.019) 
 
   
−0.221 
(−0.700)    
Unemployment 0.744*    (2.030) 
0.136 
(0.618)   
0.882 . 










1.797 2.136 0.518 
REGION_CEP 1.171** (3.229) 
1.140 *** 




3.742 3.373 0.163 
REGION_AC 0.859* (2.480) 
0.913*** 




2.722 2.038 0.092 
IDEOL_RIGH −0.557* (−1.976) 
−0.636* 




−1.620   
Wald χ2  13.123    12.976   




[0.007]    
25.071 
[0.0007]   
Log−likelihood −275.3 −282.5   −272.6 −281.0   
AIC 578.55 580.94   573.26 578.03   
Number obs. 548 548   548 548   
Notes: *Null hypothesis rejected; Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘#’ 0.1 ‘; Numbers within parentheses () denote asymptotic t-values.  The 
robust standard errors are applied in the Count_1 regression. The dummy variable for Region_NW, with 142 observations in sample ≈ 548, was omitted to 
facilitate comparison of adoption probabilities in Region_NW with the other two regions: Region_CEP and Region_AC. The political variable 
IDEOL_LEFT was omitted for similar reasons. 
 
Furthermore, a higher quality labour force is expected 
to be more efficient; therefore, it should reduce the 
average cost of idleness, leading to greater 
entrepreneurship or other economic activities. Areas with 
high levels of human capital provide a solid base of 
employees for future agro-businesses and therefore for 
using IS. Hence, a positive relationship between human 
capital and the IA variable(s) was hypothesized. 
     The mean values for human capital varied quite a bit 
between the two time-points of observation. In the later 
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period, the mean value indicated that agro-entrepreneurs 
accessed more specialized skills. 
Another measure of economic change was the change 
in development as measured by the development index. 
This overall figure decreased by small amount between 
the two time points, just 0.5% on average, with some of 
the worst communities showing an increase and the best 
communities showing substantial deterioration in 
development. Therefore, even as incomes were growing, 
overall economic development conditions worsened. 
Three major regions (Northwest, Central and Eastern, 
and Coastal) were delineated to correspond with internal 
administrative districts and county borders. Those regions 
emerged from the association of Eurostat with the State 
Department of Statistics. The boundaries of the 
administrative districts overlap with those of the statistical 
reporting districts containing the municipalities. 
Following administrative boundaries and county borders, 
the three regions were defined by mountain ranges, river 
flows, lowland areas and the Adriatic Sea coast.  
Furthermore, these regions reflect the existing and 
potential economic differences across Croatia. For 
example, agriculture and many food industry facilities are 
located in the Central and Eastern region, whereas 
government agencies, banks, industry and other major 
service sector organization headquarters are located in the 
Northwest region. For the purpose of estimation, the 
Northwest region served as the base for the empirical 
model for the comparison of regional effects. The 
economy of the coastal region that stretches along the 
eastern part of the Adriatic Sea is mainly based on the 
tourism industry. 
 
4.2  Results of the Double Hurdle Model 
4.2.1 Logit Estimations  
 
     The results of binary estimations for the probability of 
adopting an IA are shown in Tab. 2.  
The Breusch-Pagan test outcomes provide some 
evidence for the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
Therefore, the Huber-White estimator of variance is used 
instead of the conventional maximum likelihood estimator 
of variance to avoid heteroskedasticity in both reduced 
regressions.  
The Wald test is used to test the specific parameter 
constraints, i.e., the null hypothesis, which is that the 
omitted (insignificant) coefficients for the general model 
are simultaneously equal to zero. The chi-squared value 
generated by the Wald test is 2.187, with an associated p-
value of 1.976 with six degrees of freedom. The p-value is 
higher than the generally used criterion of 0.05, so we are 
not able to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that the 
coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Because 
excluding statistically insignificant predictors should lead 
to a better prediction (i.e., better model fit), we conclude 
that a reduced model will be better than a general model.  
For both samples in different periods, the agrarian 
determinants had a significant positive coefficient in our 
logit regressions. The interpretation of the exponentiated 
coefficients of the zero-hurdle model is as follows. The 
baseline odds of having a positive count versus zero in the 
adoption of IS is 0.03 on average for both samples. These 
odds are increased by 1.15 times on average with a one ha 
unit increase in vineyards and by approximately 2.28 
times on average with a one ha unit increase in vegetable 
gardens. Municipalities that have sown or raised 
plantation-type orchards in their agricultural portfolio are 
1.44 times more likely to be equipped by IA. Thus, it 
appears that the co-occurrence of IA and vegetable 
gardens in the same municipality is the most plausible 
event. The number of agricultural households does not 
have significant effect, nor does the number of nursery 
plantations, the level of human capital, income or fiscal 
potential. However, better economic development 
increases the odds of having IA by 2.14 times in the 
second period, meaning that it is more likely that a 
municipality characterized by better economic 
development would adopt IA in the second period. Here, 
the sign of the coefficient for the development index, as 
an independent variable in the model, was unexpected and 
comes as a surprise. Theoretical expectations predict the 
opposite: that depressed areas would be more likely to use 
IA. This counterintuitive result illuminates one of the 
issues regarding the use of cross-sectional data. Instead of 
establishing causality, effects, determinants, or impacts, 
our regression results may be read as implying 
correlations, relationships, and associations. The 
"correlations" presented, however, assume ceteris paribus 
conditions. This result indicates that better overall 
economic development has a strong positive impact on 
the likelihood of using IA (with a marginal effect of 
51.8% in the second observation period), which confirms 
that the gradual improvement of development conditions 
in some municipalities may help them to overcome 
obstacles to implementing IA. The calculated marginal 
effect tells us that the probability of increasing the 
development index of a municipality that adopted IA was 
0.518 higher than that of a municipality without IA, all 
other variables remaining the same. The positive 
relationship between the unemployment rate in response 
to the IA variable agrees with our theory, but here the 
unemployment rate is significant at slightly less than 10 
percent. The variable for Region_CEP was significant at 
the 0% level and positive in the Count_0 (and Count_1) 
equation, with a marginal effect of 12.5% (and 9.3%). 
The odds of having a positive count e.g. one (of IA) 
versus zero compared to the benchmark Northwest region 
increased by 3.13 times for the Central and Eastern 
region. The third regional dummy for the Coastal region 
has a similar result, also significant at the 0% level. This 
indicates that, estimated in isolation, the coastal region 
(counties Istarska, Primorsko-Goranska, Splitsko-
Dalmatinska and Dubrovačko-Neretvanska) was 
approximately 2.5 times more likely to adopt an IS 
relative to the average municipality in the Northwest 
region. Because the Central and Eastern and the Coastal 
regions are much more focused on agricultural 
development than Northwestern Croatia, this outcome is 
expected in the model. As for the ideological orientation 
of voters, we see from the negative and significant 
coefficient of IDEOL_RIGHT (only in the first time 
interval), estimated in isolation, that the more 
conservative units of observation were slightly less 
motivated to adopt IA relative to the liberal areas of the 
sample. 
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4.2.2 Results of the Count Model Estimations for Probability 
 
     Given that the response is positive in regard to IS 
adoption (among those who have positive counts), the 
average count is 17.76 ha in the first period (19.23 ha in 
the second period) of the sample observation. 
     A unit increase in income per capita decreases the ha 
under IS by 0.45 (on average) among those municipalities 
that have positive counts of ha under IS. The statistically 
significant role of income per capita in the participation 
and frequency decision is not puzzling given that the 
primary role of IS equipment should be to overcome 
economic depression in some areas of the country (see 
Tab. 3). The log of income per capita had a statistically 
significant and negative influence on the decision to 
participate in IS adoption, which was discussed earlier in 
this paper. This second stage of research again finds and 
confirms that the size plot frequency of IS as a response 
variable is negatively linked to the log of income per 
capita. According to the results, municipalities with 
higher income per capita were less likely to become land 
consumers and require irrigation than low-income per 
capita municipalities. These results, found in both time 
intervals, clearly illustrate the importance of relative 
poverty in determining the size of IS adoptions: higher-
income populations may be less exposed to agrarian 
production, could live in urban areas, or may be immersed 
in a tradition where the strong desire to succeed leads to 
make land irrelevant (aside from erecting buildings). The 
remaining socio-economic performance variables have no 
significant effect at all except for the development index, 
which increases the plot size by 40.038 times in the first 
period.   
     The variable of agricultural intensity proxied by 
agricultural households (among municipalities where they 
lived) increase the size in ha by 2.98 times, whereas 
orchards increase it by slightly less than 1.27 times, both 
among those municipalities with positive counts (size in 
ha). Because agricultural intensity levels are likely to 
respond to growing employment opportunities within 
rural areas endowed with IS equipment, Tab. 3 confirms 
the assumed theoretical conjectures. However, these 
conjectures are not confirmed by the regression results 
when binominal model techniques are applied. The most 
striking result is that vineyards and plant nurseries have a 
significant, positive and strong impact on the probability 
of the IS size frequency only in the first period, while 
these variables are insignificant for municipalities in 
2010-2012 (unlike the results from the binominal 
regression).  
 
Table 3 Second stage: Maximum likelihood estimates from the double-hurdle (count) model 
 
Count 
(area in ha) 
of IS, 2006-2008 
Count 
(area in ha) 
of IS, 2010-2012 
 Geometric distribution Exponential coefficient Negbin II distribution Exponential coefficient 
Constant 2.876*** (3.333) 17.76 
2.956** 
(2.964) 19.23 
Agriculture Households 0.883 *** (3.753) 2.418 
1.264*** 
(3.348) 3.540 
Orchards 0.167* (2.189) 1.182 
0.309* 
(2.370) 1.362 



















 0.038 (0.024)  
Income −3.221*** (−6.127) 0.039 
−2.98*** 
(−3.481) 0.050 
Revenue −0.379. (−1.890) 0.684 
−0.344 
(−0.940)  












REGION_CEP −0.158 (−0.713) 0.853 
1.262*** 
(3.473) 3.535 
REGION_AC 1.253*** (4.901) 3.503 
0.999* 
(2.423) 2.716 
IDEOL_RIGHT −0.476 * (−2.392) 0.621 
−0.583. 
(−1.925) 0.557 
Notes: *Null hypothesis rejected; Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘#’ 0.1 ‘ 
 
Regional differences in land plot frequencies for IS 
are pronounced and suggest that residents of the Adriatic 
region are more likely to be users of land units under an 
irrigation regime and, if they are users, to have more ha 
units under irrigation than those living in the NW region 
(up to 3.11 times more). The same conclusion can be 
reached when examining the Pannonia region (but only 
for the second time period). In addition, municipalities 
leaning more toward a right-wing ideology are less likely 
to include more units of ha in their IS program, and 
Zdravko ŠERGO et al.: The Modelling of Irrigation Allocation in Croatia 
Tehnički vjesnik 25, 1(2018), 172-180                                                                                                                                                                                                             179 
develop these programs more often than municipalities 
favouring the opposite party. That independent variable is 
weakly significant at the p<0.053 level in the second 
period. 
 
5  DISCUSSION OF THE TEST RESULTS 
 
Using irrigation participation and frequency data 
collected in Croatia for 2006-2008 and 2010-2012, this 
study uses binominal logit and hurdle count-data models 
[21] to analyze dislocated irrigation areas across 
municipalities in a transition economy undergoing major 
structural changes in that field.  
We estimate three discrete single-decision and hurdle 
models for Poisson, geometric and negative binomial 
distributions to simultaneously test for over dispersion 
and excess zeros with regard to the number of hectares 
under IS. Hurdle models were shown to outperform 
single-decision models across the three distributions, 
suggesting that accounting for over dispersion and excess 
zeros is essential in this study. From an economic 
behavioural viewpoint, the results confirm that zeros and 
non-zeros come from two different data-generating 
processes. Subsequently, Vuong's non-nested model 
selection tests [22] identified Geometric and Negbin II 
hurdle models as the best fit for the 2006-2008 and 2010-
2012 data sets, respectively, across the land plot 
frequencies. This indicates that accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity is required in addition to addressing over 
dispersion and excess zeros. 
One advantage of the two-stage decision model is its 
ability to address municipalities that reported zero 
frequency for land assigned to irrigation. Given the 
significant percentage of zero reports for most 
municipalities, distinguishing the decision to designate a 
plot of land for IS adoption is an essential component of 
this research.  
This study provides an analysis of the agricultural 
determinants of municipality adoption of irrigation. 
Because technological change can affect the level of 
output, product quality, etc., the adoption of a public good 
such as irrigation offers economic opportunities through 
plant production. Broad differences were observed among 
the agricultural characteristics: the number of agricultural 
households and plant nurseries are important in the 
second hurdle, which predicts the number of hectares with 
irrigation, while these features are unimportant for the 
first hurdle. More specifically, the study shows important 
differences between the effects of vineyards and 
vegetable gardens on each of the two hurdles. Farmers 
living in municipalities cultivating plants and having 
access to watering are significantly more likely to adopt 
irrigation technology. However, once the farmer adopts 
irrigation, cultivation of a vineyard or a vegetable garden 
may not be a decisive influence on the farmer’s decision 
to apply the irrigation in the second period. 
For both samples in the different periods, the log of 
income per capita has a significant positive coefficient in 
the double-hurdle (count) models but not in the binominal 
models. There is a higher likelihood that a municipality 
with a higher standard of living will accept irrigation as a 
development strategy (among those that require irrigation) 
among those that have already anticipated irrigation as a 
type of public good. Poorer municipalities in Croatia, as 
measured by per capita income, are less likely to increase 
the number of hectares under irrigation to, presumably, 
include more economically distressed areas. It is more 
politically difficult to justify targeting irrigation programs 
for economically distressed areas in poorer municipalities 
when depression hits the entire national economy. As is 
well known, Croatia has been plagued by a recession that 
started in 2009. Richer municipalities are more agile in 
bad times and less risk averse in terms of investing in 
irrigation programs; thus they can deliver public goods for 
local agricultural households. The results of the binominal 
(and hurdle) regression indicate that the cumulative 
causation indicated by higher development index has a 
positive impact on the likelihood of using IS, stressing the 
importance of market potential for selling agricultural 
output among those municipalities that benefited from 
irrigation. 
 
6  CONCLUSION 
 
     The estimated results for land (count) frequencies 
illustrate the importance of using the two-stage 
behavioural model. We did not obtain confirmation of the 
results from the logit regression on adoption of irrigation 
in the count regression. Specifically, the significant effect 
of unemployment on the probability of participating in 
irrigation demand indicates that local authorities are not 
driven to expand IS programs as a weapon in the battle 
against unemployment. Among those municipalities that 
use irrigation, it appears that unemployment problems are 
not a priority because they possess well-to-do micro-
populations.   
     The estimated hurdle models confirm the results of the 
logit regressions and clearly establish that left-wing 
ideology directly affects the decision to adopt irrigation 
programs and the frequency of land in ha under irrigation. 
The left-wing coalition is far less represented in rural 
milieus. These results confirm our expectation that 
irrigation adoption patterns would differ across the 
various socioeconomic units that characterize the average 
municipality in Croatia. In addition, this study revealed a 
noticeable difference in irrigation adoption patterns across 
geographic regions. The economic impact of the transition 
towards a market economy while fighting against the 
fragile economies of central and eastern Pannonia and 
coastal Croatia is equivalent to a strong negative external 
shock and is further aggravating their economic situation. 
In 2000, the re-building of these regions often led to a 
lavishly subsidized agriculture sector. This region is 
characterized by higher initiative in IS adoption as an 
instrument of agricultural development than the 
Northwestern region. This result is consistent with an 
understanding that the Northwestern area is reorienting 
away from agriculture in the long run, and thus irrigation 
systems are relatively absent compared to the other two 
regions of Croatia. 
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